Operational Pressures Escalation Levels Framework

NHS England South Central
Version 2.0 July 2017
NHS England-South Central Operational Pressures Escalation Levels (OPEL) Framework

Version number: 2.0 July 2017. This replaces all previous drafts and versions

First published: November 2016

Prepared by: Gail King, Head of Emergency Preparedness and Programme Lead for Urgent & Emergency Care, NHS England- South Central

Classification: OFFICIAL
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1 Introduction

This NHS England-South Central Operational Pressures Escalation Levels (OPEL) Framework has been aligned to the national framework issued in October 2016. It sets out the procedures across the Thames Valley, Bath, Gloucester, Swindon and Wiltshire (BGSW) to manage day to day variations in demand across the health and social care system as well as the procedures for managing significant surges in demand.

The aims of this OPEL Framework are to provide a consistent approach in times of pressure 7 days a week, specifically by:

- Enabling local systems to maintain quality and patient safety;
- Providing a nationally and locally consistent set of escalation levels, triggers and protocols, for local A&E Delivery Boards to align their existing escalation processes to;
- Setting clear expectations around roles and responsibilities for all those involved in escalation in response to surge pressures at local level (providers, commissioners and local authorities), by Directors of Commissioning Operations (DCO) and NHS Improvement local/regional team level, regional level and national level;
- Influence short term, medium term and long term goals in conjunction with effective horizon scanning;
- Setting consistent terminology.

This framework is designed for managers and clinicians involved in managing capacity and patient throughput at a time of excess demand and/or other operational pressures, and is applicable all year round, and not just in response to winter pressures.

It is to be circulated to all staff who participates under such circumstances, to provide a practical working reference tool for all parties, thereby aiding co-ordination, communication and implementation of the appropriate actions in each organisation.

It is imperative however that each system has their own plan in place to respond to escalation outlining a minimum set of expectations and actions which includes the localisations and initiatives that are in place for that system using existing cross organisational partnerships.

It should be read in conjunction with the NHS England South Central Onward Care Procedure Version 3.0 April 2017, the National Operational Escalation Levels Framework 2016, S Sustainable Transformation Partnerships (STP) Urgent & Emergency Care Plans and A&E Improvement Plans.

It is recommended that this framework and action cards should be exercised along with local plans annually using a ‘system reset’ methodology referenced
locally as i.e. “Perfect Week” “Spring to Green” and “Breaking the Cycle” exercises.

2 Principles and overview of the national framework

To enable local A&E Delivery Boards to align their escalation protocols to a standardised process the national framework, has been built on work already done across the four STPs.

The levels mirror the escalation frameworks already in use across systems around the country, and align with the national Resource Escalation Action Plan 2 (REAP) used by Ambulance trusts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational Pressures Escalation Levels</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPEL One</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OPEL Two</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>OPEL Three</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPEL Four</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Local A&E Delivery Board areas will operate Operational Pressures Escalation Level (OPEL) 1 when operating within normal parameters. At OPEL 1 and 2, we would anticipate operations and escalation to be delegated to the relevant named accountable officer in each organisation across the A&E Delivery Board. At OPEL 3
and 4 however, it would be expected that there would be executive level involvement across the A&E Delivery Board, as agreed locally.

3 Guidance for use of the NHS England-South Central Operational Pressures Escalation Levels Framework

Only when all escalation measures have been exhausted and the system is not recovering will organisations act from a position of last resort in response to the most unusual and exceptional pressures to access capacity beyond A&E Delivery Board boundaries. In such circumstances decisions must be made with the overall best interests of patients and service users as the top priority.

This framework should be triggered where an A&E Delivery Board experiences pressure such that despite all escalation actions exhausted by the local system to reduce that pressure, an external whole system response for assistance is needed. This response must be clearly defined in local action cards / escalation plans and fully understood by all relevant managers, clinicians and accountable officers.

Each system must therefore define and agree local measures and triggers aligned to the indicators / actions, roles and responsibilities throughout the escalation process including those which trigger a request for external assistance.

The trigger for request for external assistance will be the declaration by the relevant A&E Delivery Board of whole system ‘OPEL 4’ status.

The implementation of external support must be agreed by all relevant parties, following which the A&E Delivery Board shall inform NHS England-South Central who in turn will inform NHS Improvement and the Regional Office. This contact will be initiated and maintained by the executive director on call for the lead commissioners of the A&E Delivery Board.

3.1 Use of the Divert Protocol

If any diverts are agreed, the A&E Delivery Board by which assistance was given must raise a Serious Incident (SI) and undertake a full investigation; root-cause analysis including themes that are highlighted throughout the day and lessons learnt exercise in a timely manner. They must also inform NHS England-South Central if any divert has been agreed and implemented (see page 11).

4 NHS England-South Central expectations of A&E Delivery Boards

Individual A&E Delivery Boards are expected to manage the escalation and de-escalation processes at local level and this framework does not seek to prescribe the detail of these processes and their management, however, for guidance a ‘Terms of Reference’ and ‘System de-escalation Agenda’ has been included for your
assistance and for consideration of local adoption to help facilitate a coordinated whole system response – please see Appendix 7 and 8 for reference. System-wide teleconference calls can be a really useful way to co-ordinate a response to an escalating or de-escalating situation and can be managed at the discretion of individual organisations. The scheduling of these can be part of business as usual for system’s resilience or when deemed necessary. It must be noted however that escalation to ‘OPEL 4’ status or the threat of such escalation at A&E Delivery Board or organisational level automatically triggers mandatory action within this framework. Please refer to section 5 below.

The following points should be addressed as part of the process of planning for operational pressures escalation and are seen as a good practice checklist:

1. Each STP/A&E Delivery Board partner organisation within a A&E Delivery Board geography must have a robust, up-to-date local Operational Pressure Escalation Level plan signed off at Board level which aligns with the overarching A&E Delivery Board plan and focuses on early warning triggers and the prediction of potential issues/expected peaks in demand and be able to respond to unpredicted surges in activity and demand;

2. Each acute trust is also required to have an ambulance services handover plan and comply with its obligations under the plan;

3. Operational pressures escalation planning must also form an integral part of winter planning or seasonal and geographical predicted demand and expected rise in activity, which will be specific to holidays or local events and be able to demonstrate at a system and local level both preparedness and resilience;

4. It is expected that all individual operational pressures escalation plans will have clearly defined escalation triggers, with corresponding actions to be taken to avoid the need for escalation and to enable de-escalation as quickly as possible. Example triggers (including to ‘OPEL 4’ status), actions and further information for escalation in the OPEL 1-4 range are available in the OPEL Action Cards. It should be noted that these are neither exhaustive or prescriptive and are for information only. Please note that the decision to escalate to ‘OPEL 4’ status at organisational level or the threat of such decision automatically invokes mandatory action within this framework. Please refer to Section 5 below;

5. Special measures and specific escalation action will be required where an Emergency Department (ED) is unable to take new attenders into a safe environment. Discussion with agreed actions must be directed through NHS England-South Central in conjunction with the relevant CCG prior to any declaration of a Critical Incident;
6. There must be clear identification of the system leaders and accountable officers (including identification of organisation, role/s and responsibilities) who will oversee all levels of escalation, especially those where whole A&E Delivery Board action is needed to avoid or mitigate pressure, and where external support might be required;

7. Where an organisation and / or an A&E Delivery Board have undergone escalation of status it is expected that the executive directors of the lead commissioners shall lead the de-escalation process once review shows a managed and sustained reduced pressure.

Additional points for consideration:

- Timely and fit for purpose information is crucial to the management of the escalation and de-escalation process;
- Consideration must be given to the onward care of patients transferred or initially taken to a receiving organisation (please refer to the Onward Care Procedure for NHS England-South Central);
- An identified executive level director in each partner organisation will hold the responsibility for ensuring that escalation plans are actioned, reviewed and held to account on expected delivery and follow through;
- All escalation level plans relating to a given A&E Delivery Board should be readily available to all relevant managers and clinicians. All should have a clear and current understanding of the processes and their role and responsibility;
- The impact on Emergency Department facilities due to the knock on effect of a local system must be considered;
- A stringent response to all ambulance handover delays is appropriate.

4.1 At system wide level

When it is determined at the daily teleconference by the leading CCG that the whole system is at ‘OPEL 4’, this will be escalated to NHS England-South Central on Call Manager for Thames Valley and BGSW, who will escalate to the relevant NHSE Director on Call and NHS I lead in and out of hours.

4.2 12 hour breaches

Any 12 hour breaches must be declared to the lead CCG who in turn will inform NHS E South Central. NHS Improvement will also be notified.
Appendix 1 Escalation Communication Flow Chart

**Escalation Communication Process**

- **OPEL 1:** No capacity issues, actions ongoing to manage patient flow within available resources
  - Action sufficient to return system to OPEL 1?
    - Yes
      - **OPEL 2:** Focused actions within organisations showing pressure to return to OPEL 1 status
    - No
      - **OPEL 3:** Further urgent actions required by all partners to return the system to OPEL 2
  - Action sufficient to return the system to OPEL 2?
    - Yes
      - **OPEL 4 (organisational level):** All actions have failed to contain service pressures and the local health system is unable to deliver comprehensive emergency care. Further action and investigation required
    - No

**CCG Communication**

- Normal levels of communication with all services and co-ordination to monitor the status of services across the locality
- Communication across whole system to alert organisations to pressure points and support actions to return the system to OPEL 1 status
- Clinical engagement to resolve situation
- Undertake actions to co-ordinate response across whole system. Additional resources commissioned where appropriate. CCG director on call briefed. Post escalation: investigation of causes and internal lessons learnt exercise
- Responsible Persons to discuss and agree progression to OPEL 4 – final responsibility lies with CCG. CCG Chief Executive briefed as part of decision making process
- Consider any request for support beyond local economy boundaries and liaise with NHS SC to request this support. On-going co-ordination of actions from OPEL 3 and further urgent actions. Report on SI on STEIS. Post escalation – communication de-escalation to all parties including NHS SC and conduct full root cause analysis to be shared with whole system

**NHSE SC Communication**

- No action required
- NHSE SC on call to be informed of decision to proceed to OPEL 4 on-call number pager: TV: 07623505519, BGSw: 07623505520, NHS 43 NHSE SC involved in key decisions and requests for cut of locality region assistance. NHSE SC to inform to Regional Team & Comms Team Post escalation: SI investigation signed off in accordance with policy

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# Appendix 2 Escalation Status Triggers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Escalation level</th>
<th>Acute Trust (s)</th>
<th>Community Care</th>
<th>Social care</th>
<th>Primary care</th>
<th>Other issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **OPEL One**     | • Demand for services within normal parameters  
• There is capacity available for the expected emergency and elective demand. No staffing issues identified  
• No technological difficulties impacting on patient care  
• Use of specialist units/beds/wards have capacity  
• Good patient flow through ED and other access points. Pressure on maintaining ED 4 hour target  
• Infection control issues monitored and deemed within normal parameters | • Community capacity available across system. Patterns of service and acceptable levels of capacity are for local determination | • Social services able to facilitate placements, care packages and discharges from acute care and other hospital and community based settings | • Out of Hours (OOH) service demand within expected levels  
• GP attendances within expected levels with appointment availability sufficient to meet demand |  
| **OPEL Two**     | • Anticipated pressure in facilitating ambulance handovers within 60 minutes  
• Insufficient discharges to create capacity for the expected elective and emergency activity  
• Opening of escalation beds likely (in addition to those already in use)  
• Infection control issues emerging  
• Lower levels of staff available but are sufficient to maintain services  
• Lack of beds across the Acute Trust  
• ED patients with DTAs and no action plan  
• Capacity pressures on PICU, NICU, and other intensive care and specialist beds (possibly including ECMO) | • Patients in community and / or acute settings waiting for community care capacity  
• Lack of medical cover for community beds  
• Infection control issues emerging  
• Lower levels of staff available, but are sufficient to maintain services | • Patients in community and / or acute settings waiting for social services capacity  
• Some unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions)  
• Lower levels of staff available, but are sufficient to maintain services  
• Community capacity full  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow | • GP attendances higher than expected levels  
• OOH service demand is above expected levels  
• Some unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions)  
• Lower levels of staff available, but are sufficient to maintain services | • NHS 111 call volume above normal levels  
• Rising NHS 111 call volume increases demand  
• Surveillance information dictates an increase in demand  
• Weather warnings suggest a significant increase in demand |
| **OPEL Three**   | • Actions at OPEL Two failed to deliver capacity  
• Significant deterioration in performance against the ED 4 hour target (e.g. a drop of 10% or more in the space of 24 hours)  
• Patients awaiting handover from ambulance service within 60 minutes significantly compromised  
• Patient flow significantly compromised  
• Unable to meet transfer from Acute Trusts within 48 hour timeframe  
• Awaiting equipment causing delays for a number of other patients  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow  
• Serious capacity pressures escalation beds and on PICU, NICU, and other intensive care and specialist beds (possibly including ECMO)  
• Problems reported with Support Services (IT, Transport, Facilities Pathology etc.) that cannot be rectified within 2 hours | • Community capacity full  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow | • Social services unable to facilitate care packages, discharges etc.  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers to under 50% (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow  
• Some unexpected reduced staffing numbers after 10% drop in capacity (e.g. sickness, weather conditions)  
• Social services able to facilitate care packages, discharges etc.  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers to under 50% (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow  
• Social services unable to facilitate care packages, discharges etc.  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow  
• Social services unable to facilitate care packages, discharges etc.  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow  
• Social services unable to facilitate care packages, discharges etc.  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow | • Pressure on OOH/GP services resulting in pressure on acute sector  
• Significant, unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow  
• OOH service demand is above expected levels  
• Community capacity full  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers to under 50% (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow  
• Social services unable to facilitate care packages, discharges etc.  
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• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow |  
| **OPEL Four**    | • Actions at OPEL Three failed to deliver capacity  
• No capacity across the Acute Trust  
• Severe ambulance handover delays  
• Emergency care pathway significantly compromised  
• Unable to offload ambulances within 120 minutes  
• Unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow is at a level that compromises service provision / patient safety  
• Severe capacity pressures on PICU, NICU, and other intensive care and specialist beds (possibly including ECMO)  
• Infectious illness, Norovirus, severe weather, and other pressures in Acute Trusts (including ED handover breaches)  
• Problems reported with Support Services (IT, Transport, Facilities Pathology etc.) that cannot be rectified within 4 hours | • No capacity in community services  
• Unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow | • Social services unable to facilitate care packages, discharges etc.  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow | • Acute Trust unable to admit GP referrals  
• Inability to see all OOH/GP urgent patients  
• Unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow is at a level that compromises service provision / patient safety  
• Social services unable to facilitate care packages, discharges etc.  
• Significant unexpected reduced staffing numbers (due to e.g. sickness, weather conditions) in areas where this causes increased pressure on patient flow |  

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Appendix 3 Implementation of a Divert

Extraordinary pressures faced by acute trust. All internal and local escalation measures exhausted (If circumstances extreme, acute trusts may decide to declare an internal critical incident (following individual trust pathway) through CCG)). Divert required. Organisational ‘OPEL 4’ status declared*

Acute Trust Director on call contacts relevant CCG director on call. A dynamic risk assessment is undertaken across local health system. The acute trust agrees need for divert with CCG. Details of support required discussed and logged. Local system ‘OPEL 4’ status declared*. Acute trust contacts neighbouring acute trusts to ascertain suitability and ability to support divert in liaison with the CCG. NHSE SC must be informed of any divert agreed and implemented.

**Flowchart**

- **Hospital support available**
  - Formal request made to ambulance service by acute trust. Details of support required discussed and logged.
  - Ambulance can support
    - Acute trust updates CCG with details of divert support offered. Diverting CCG liaises directly with receiving CCG. Timing and stand-down procedure confirmed.
  - Ambulance cannot support
    - Acute trust informs other commissioners, other ambulance services, and relevant stakeholders with details agreed with hospitals. All details logged and information cascaded internally by trust comms team. Divert implemented.

- **Hospital support not available**
  - An alternative action plan is put in place by requesting hospital in conjunction with CCG. Internal and local escalation measures are rechecked. Acute trust follows critical incident pathway.
  - Acute trust contacts CCG director on call and discusses the option for using private ambulance to transport patients as required. This arrangement is to be agreed by receiving hospital.
  - Acute Trust and CCG considers 1:1 divert of select speciality patients to other acute trusts to alleviate pressure. It also considers a rolling hour by hour divert across the system in conjunction with the ambulance service.

**Decision Points**

- Is time agreed for divert running out?
  - Yes
    - Pressure alleviated? (Monitoring in line with timescales of divert)
      - Yes
        - Acute trust informs all relevant parties. Raises SI. Secures position. Seeks further de-escalation
      - No
        - Pressure alleviated? (Monitoring in line with timescales of divert)
          - Yes
            - Acute trust informs all relevant parties. Raises SI. Secures position. Seeks further de-escalation
          - No
            - Acute trust informs all relevant parties. Raises SI. Secures position. Seeks further de-escalation

*It would of course be expected that the whole health economy would work together in the usual way to avert escalation and facilitate de-escalation at all levels. This flowchart does not indicate that the acute trust should wait until it declare OPEL 4 before contacting...*
Appendix 4 Serious Incident Guidance

The Framework applies to serious incidents which occur in all services providing NHS funded care. This includes independent providers where NHS funded services are delivered.

The emphasis in the updated framework is one of open and honest discussion and ‘if in doubt – report it’. Downgrading can be agreed at any time.

Definition of Serious Incident

- Acts and/or omissions occurring as part of NHS-funded healthcare (including in the community) that result in:
  - Unexpected or avoidable death of one or more people. This includes
    - suicide/self-inflicted death; and
    - homicide by a person in receipt of mental health care within the recent past;
  - Unexpected or avoidable injury to one or more people that has resulted in serious harm;
  - Unexpected or avoidable injury to one or more people that requires further treatment by a healthcare professional in order to prevent:
    - the death of the service user; or
    - serious harm;
  - Actual or alleged abuse; sexual abuse, physical or psychological ill-treatment, or acts of omission which constitute neglect, exploitation, financial or material abuse, discriminative and organisational abuse, self-neglect, domestic abuse, human trafficking and modern day slavery where:
    - healthcare did not take appropriate action/intervention to safeguard against such abuse occurring; or
    - where abuse occurred during the provision of NHS-funded care.

This includes abuse that resulted in (or was identified through) a Serious Case Review (SCR), Safeguarding Adult Review (SAR), Safeguarding Adult Enquiry or other externally-led investigation, where delivery of NHS funded care caused/contributed towards the incident (see Part One; sections 1.3 and 1.5 for further information).

- A Never Event - all Never Events are defined as serious incidents although not all Never Events necessarily result in serious harm or death.
- An incident (or series of incidents) that prevents, or threatens to prevent, an organisation’s ability to continue to deliver an acceptable quality of healthcare services, including (but not limited to) the following:
  - Failures in the security, integrity, accuracy or availability of information often described as data loss and/or information governance related issues (see Appendix 2 for further information);
  - Property damage;
  - Security breach/concern;
  - Incidents in population-wide healthcare activities like screening and immunisation programmes where the potential for harm may extend to a large population;
  - Inappropriate enforcement/care under the Mental Health Act (1983) and the Mental Capacity Act (2005) including Mental Capacity Act, Deprivation of Liberty Safeguards (MCA DOLS);
  - Systematic failure to provide an acceptable standard of safe care (this may include incidents, or series of incidents, which necessitate ward/ unit closure or suspension of services); or
• Activation of Major Incident Plan (by provider, commissioner or relevant agency)

**Definition of Serious Harm**

- Severe harm (patient safety incident that appears to have resulted in permanent harm to one or more persons receiving NHS-funded care);
- Chronic pain (continuous, long-term pain of more than 12 weeks or after the time that healing would have been thought to have occurred in pain after trauma or surgery);
- Psychological harm, impairment to sensory, motor or intellectual function or impairment to normal working or personal life which is not likely to be temporary (i.e. has lasted, or is likely to last for a continuous period of at least 28 days).

**Responsibilities and Timescales**

The first section (in bold) is the most likely to be needed by an on-call manager/director. Other timescales are included for further information if required

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event/Action</th>
<th>Timescale</th>
<th>Further Information/Guidance</th>
<th>Responsibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serious Incident identified - Report to commissioner of service or lead commissioner (as agreed)</td>
<td>As soon as possible and within 2 working days of the incident being identified.</td>
<td>Report via STEIS (or if no access to STEIS, via the serious incident reporting form agreed with the commissioner, sent via e-mail to agreed e-mail address)</td>
<td>Provider where incident occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or</td>
<td></td>
<td>Where immediate notification is required, this must be also by telephone (including use of On-Call system Out of Hours)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate where:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The provider or commissioner Major Incident Policy is invoked</td>
<td></td>
<td>If there is any doubt about whether an incident is serious or not, the principle is to report it as it can be downgraded later if necessary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- There is (or is likely to be) significant public concern and/or media interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Incident will be of significance to the police.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>If provider has no STEIS access, input details of incident from report form from provider onto STEIS</td>
<td>On receipt of form.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comply with any further reporting and liaison requirements with regulators and other agencies</td>
<td>Within 2 working days of the incident being identified.</td>
<td>See appendix 2 of the Framework.</td>
<td>Provider where incident occurred</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carry out an initial review of the incident and provide a copy of the report of this to the commissioner</td>
<td>Within 3 working days of the incident being identified.</td>
<td>This will inform the level of investigation required.</td>
<td>Provider where incident occurred</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Serious Incident Framework, March 2015 can be obtained from the NHS England website: [https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/patientsafety/serious-incident/](https://www.england.nhs.uk/ourwork/patientsafety/serious-incident/)
Appendix 5 Supporting Information

**Complete Closure**
This is when an Emergency Department can no longer accept patients and is crowded to an extent where its occupancy levels have exceeded capacity and might be deemed as unsafe. This will happen in very extreme circumstances only, e.g. when an Internal Critical Incident is declared, and not normally for reasons of capacity shortfall or escalation.

**Partial Closure**
This is when an Emergency Department will accept only certain, clinically urgent patients, in life limiting or life threatening emergencies.

**ECMO**
In intensive care medicine, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (commonly abbreviated ECMO) or extracorporeal life support (ECLS) is an extracorporeal technique of providing both cardiac and respiratory support to patients whose heart and lungs are so severely diseased or damaged that they can no longer serve their function. Initial cannulation of a patient receiving ECMO is performed by a surgeon or anesthetist and maintenance of the patient is the responsibility of the perfusionist or ECMO specialist who gives 24/7 monitoring care for the duration of the ECMO treatment.

**Emerging Emergency Issues and Horizon Scanning**
In the event of an emerging issue from local/regional intelligence that may impact on the system or may alert interest from the local media or then the normal command, control, coordination and communication arrangements should be initiated. CCGs should be informed as well as NHS England-South Central for situational awareness and onward cascade if assistance is required. Both should consider who needs to be informed, who may be affected by the incident and who may be able to offer support and what actions need to be taken.

**Escalation Level Triggers**
All organisations have adopted the common triggers to ensure equity of pressure; capacity and access (see Appendix 2).

**Hospital Ambulance Liaison Officer (HALO)**
This is an operational management /supervisory presence within all major Emergency Department / Assessment Units during periods of high activity and demand. The Hospital Ambulance Liaison Officer (HALO) role is to; provide an ambulance interface with managers within the ED, monitor ED pressures and to facilitate the timely handover of patients, where possible assist in the monitoring and
caring for queuing ambulance patients until hospital queue nurses are deployed and dynamically manage the early turnaround of ambulances.

**A&E Delivery Board**
A health and social care whole system grouping (usually geographically defined). This is likely (but not exhaustively) to comprise a number of CCGs, acute trust(s), social care organisations, mental health trusts, ambulance service and OOH providers.

Where there is more than one CCG within an operational economy (e.g. one large acute Trust providing significant levels of service for a number of CCGs) there should be agreement of a lead CCG to co-ordinate communication and escalation within the system supported by other local CCGs. These responsibilities must be clearly identified within the local health economy plans. For local CCGs responsibilities regarding co-ordination and communication of escalation must be clearly defined and agreed.

**Major Incident/Critical Incident**
Any event which presents a serious threat to the health of the community, disruption to the service, or causes (or is likely to cause) such numbers or types of casualties as to require special arrangements to be implemented by NHS England local regional offices, NHS Trusts, Ambulance Services or CCGs. Normal command, control, coordination and communication arrangements should be initiated.

It is not normally expected that escalation would be the cause of a major incident as escalation is a result of general capacity and demand pressure rather than pressure caused by a specific event. However, there may well be actions that are common to escalation OPEL levels 3 and 4 and major incident plans and these should be considered within local economy escalation plans and action cards.

The latter however, should not be confused with general escalation due to wider resilience structures and processes in place. As such, local Acute Trusts may declare an 'Internal Critical Incident' during times of great pressure or 'Business Continuity Incident' where they activate their Business Continuity arrangements but should reserve the declaration of a major incident for when an organisation requires the formal multi-agency response as defined within Local Resilience Forum (LRF) plans. For example fire, flood or infectious disease outbreak.

**Peripheral Divert**
Border patients are taken by the Ambulance Service to neighbouring organisations to alleviate capacity issues.
Resourcing Escalatory Action Plan (REAP)
The REAP plan is a set of pre-agreed actions to manage escalating demand by increasing capacity. It is always in operation, normally at level one, but higher levels are triggered as demand increases.

Responsible Person / Accountable Officer
A senior employee authorised by the Chief Executive of an individual provider to implement agreed diversions and to notify relevant parties in accordance with this framework. The responsible person must have decision making ability and authority, and an organisation wide view. The responsible person may be specified as a post (e.g. Duty Emergency Department Consultant, Duty Director, Operations Director) if desired. 24/7 arrangements must be in place for this person’s role to be covered in person or by a deputy with clarity regarding communication. There must be a clear communication link between the responsible person and the Chief Executive.

Serious Incident Reporting: Refer to Appendix 4.
## Appendix 6 Reverse Triage Algorithm Guide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Risk of Medical Event</th>
<th>Basis</th>
<th>Triage Category</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Minimum</td>
<td>No anticipated medical event during next 72 hours</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Deemed medically fit /stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Low</td>
<td>Calculated risk of non-fatal medical event. Consider early discharge</td>
<td>Green</td>
<td>Consider discharge home with assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Moderate</td>
<td>Consequential medical event quite likely without critical intervention</td>
<td>Yellow</td>
<td>Discharge home not advisable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - High</td>
<td>Patient care cannot be interrupted without virtually assured morbidity or mortality</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>Highly skilled care required</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 - Very High</td>
<td>Patient cannot be mover or readily transferred</td>
<td>Red</td>
<td>ITU care required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 7 System Resilience Calls Terms of Reference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘ORGANISATION ENTER HERE’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(enter time) System Resilience Call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chairperson</th>
<th>Enter respective chair of CCG/Urgent Care Lead as appropriate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The chairperson is responsible for leading and facilitating an action focused discussion to coordinate and hold to account stakeholder and partner outcomes to enable de-escalation of the whole system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The chairperson will refer to both local/organisational and NHSE South Central OPEL Frameworks and action cards using as a prompt to bring about the appropriate and desired actions in direct response to escalation, demand and activity and hold members to account on delivery, expected outcomes and follow through.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administration / Secretarial Support</th>
<th>If not available;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post call report, <strong>delete or amend</strong> including reporting tools i.e. Alamac Lighthouse Daily) (Monday to Friday) report will be circulated to members by the nominated CCG lead chairing that day's call.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountable to</th>
<th>Each organisation on the call is accountable for taking forward agreed actions and working in line with the NHSE SC OPEL Framework.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On a daily (weekday) basis the Senior Manager within Urgent and Unplanned Care (or equivalent) chairing the call will ensure that the CCG Director on call is aware during the day of any system issues for escalation impacting on expected performance and delivery of standards; with a report at the end of the day (even when there is nil of note to describe).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The conference call represents a virtual sub-group of the Urgent Care Operational Group (UCOG) and/or alternative accountable sub-group as determined in your local geography, as such the call will be a standing item on the <strong>enter appropriate board/group</strong> agenda; with the <strong>enter appropriate board/group</strong> in turn being accountable to the A+E Delivery Board.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Escalation Triggers

The agreed NHSE South Central OPEL Framework describes the required actions on each alert status.

Should the System be on OPEL 3 (‘Red alert’); then the CCG chair will escalate to the CCG Director on – call; a further call may be convened at (enter and amend time) 1pm; or the chair may request for individual agencies to update the CCG on progress in relation to any agreed actions throughout the day as required.

Individual members dialling into the System Call will have operational knowledge and be senior enough to positively influence de-escalation.

### Escalation Triggers – cont’d

The CCG on-call Director must be contacted in or out of hours should any part of the system find that they are continuing to escalate whilst already in OPEL 3.

*It is a requirement to contact the CCG on-call Director should any part of the system need to declare OPEL 4 (‘Black Alert’).*

### Purpose

The NHSE South Central OPEL Framework is the on-going means by which the system aims to collectively manage any sudden and unpredictable surges in activity impacting on the balance of demand over capacity in key services.

A vital part of these arrangements is the *(amend as appropriate 9.30am)* System Resilience Call (Monday to Friday, excluding Bank Holidays) – chaired by the CCG; which talks through any system pressures and the metrics adopted specific to your local system.

This is the means by which all providers and partners will be able to facilitate communication about operational system issues as they arise, supporting each other to ensure de-escalation is achieved as required.

Actions to be taken locally to address, contain or accommodate demand with full details and responsibilities of providers will be shared during the call to ensure a consistent and appropriate response in the event of significant capacity pressures and demand.

*(delete or amend subject to relevance)* The impact of the Alamac Kitbag is measured through daily telephone conference calls, where the data, its impact and the performance support that this tool provides is assessed by the system.

The call also provides the valuable opportunity to monitor the actions of the system and to take action in advance of surge activity and to assess the performance of the system post a surge event.
| 12hrs Breach process | 1. **Enter acute provider details** to inform the System Call chair if a 12hr breach has taken place or is likely during the next 24hrs.  
2. Daily Calls Chair flags the possibility of a 12 hr breach to CCG Quality team and Head of Performance so that the CCG can prepare for necessary upwards reporting to NHS E.  
3. Should the breach actually occur - Daily Calls chair requests immediate 12 hour trolley wait report from the Provider and shares with CCG Quality Team and Head of Performance.  
4. Daily Calls Chair, if breach occurs, also requests/ensures SIRI 72 hr report is provided and shared with CCG Quality team and Head of Performance.  
5. Normal SIRI process continues with CCG Quality monitoring  
6. At 60 days SIRI report received by Quality and shared with Head of Performance and Urgent Care team.  
7. **CCG provide the same report for NHS England and A+E Delivery Board Assurance** |
|---|---|
| Frequency of Conference Call | **Agreed locally**  
Daily Monday – Friday (excluding weekends and Bank Holidays) at (amend as appropriate) 9.30am.  
Extra-ordinary calls at the weekend / Bank Holiday to be arranged by the on-call CCG Director as required or as directed by NHSE |
| Conference Call Telephone numbers | **Enter Telephone number**  
Access Codes:-  
Chair – *enter code*  
Participant – *enter code* |
| Members key Responsibilities | All members will have a positive ‘can do’ attitude ensuring that every opportunity to de-escalate is explored and acted on as appropriate; all members will be accountable for delivery of actions within their own areas of responsibility and be able to demonstrate and evidence progressing plans and mitigating actions and the necessary steps taken to de-escalate |
### Reporting Arrangements

Each organisation will ensure that the required daily reports are entered into the local identified kitbag/toolkit by (enter time) each morning; along with weekend activity as appropriate.

This data is then summarised and reported regularly to the (enter details of approved board/group i.e. STP A&EDB)

All members are responsible for providing responses and feedback to (enter details of approved board/group)

### Membership – usual contact details

**CCG Urgent Care Chair (rota basis):**

*Enter Accountable officer name*, COO/Senior Executive Lead or Commissioning Manager, *enter* CCG,

*Mobile: enter details here*

*Enter Accountable officer name*, Commissioning Manager, *enter* CCG,

*Tel: details here, Mobile: details here*

**Usual Representatives attending system call:**

(All Health and Social Care Partners to be named below)

- Acute Providers
- Ambulance/PTS providers
- Community Providers
- CHC
- Social Care Providers
- Council
- Local Authority
- Other partners and stakeholders (NHSI)

### Attendance / Quorum

The (amend as appropriate 9.30am) System Resilience conference call will require sufficient and regular representation from across the health and social care system to ensure effective decision making and delivery of the agreed daily de-escalation plan.

Quorum will include a minimum of one representative from: *enter each health and social care partner as a minimum* i.e. Acute, CCG, Social Care, Community, Council, Local Authority
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Review of terms of reference</th>
<th>The membership and terms of reference shall be reviewed annually. Any proposals to change the terms of reference or membership must be approved by <em>(approved body – enter details here)</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Date Ratified</td>
<td>Agreed by the <em>(approved body – enter details here)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Date approved <em>(enter date)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review date</td>
<td><em>(enter date)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 8 System Management & De-Escalation Call Agenda

SYSTEM MANAGEMENT & DE-ESCALATION CALL AGENDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE / time of call</th>
<th>Urgent Care System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Telephone No</td>
<td>Weekday/Weekend/BHol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIN</td>
<td>Call Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>System OPEL 1,2,3 or 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

PARTICIPANTS ON CALL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Names</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acute Trust Provider</td>
<td>OPEL Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acute Trust Provider</td>
<td>OPEL Level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other providers</td>
<td>OPEL Level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ambulance
NE PTS
CCG(s)
Local Authority
Council
Community Provider
Partnership Trust

ISSUES / PRESSURE LEADING TO ESCALATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exceptional issues arising from weekend or overnight</th>
<th>i.e. surges in activity, increase in ED presentations, repatriation, workforce, DTOC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What are the key issues affecting flow today</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where is the biggest risk in the system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) How will this be mitigated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) By who</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) By when</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>See action table</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the known blocks or barriers in the system and what support is needed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there any major patient safety issues</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are there any major workforce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What benefit/ outcome do we need to achieve de-escalation?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have all organisations confirmed that they have implemented all relevant actions from their own internal escalation plans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What measures are in place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What has already been exhausted other than business as usual</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has any provider declared or is about to declare an internal critical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SYSTEM RESPONSE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation Owner</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Accountable</th>
<th>Delivery Deadline</th>
<th>Predicted Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acute Trust Provider</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Provider</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What else is the CCG doing to manage and support the system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision for further escalation / GOLD call</td>
<td>YES / NO</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Lead</td>
<td>Time agreed</td>
<td>Directors on call</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Impact on performance and activity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timeframes for de-escalation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS England / NHS Improvement comments</td>
<td>What support measures can be considered for extra resilience and / or to accommodate de-escalation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comms/media issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Any other Business | Weekend Planning  
Emergency preparedness  
Local events  
Weather warnings  
Security Alerts  
Bank Holiday / Easter Plans |
| CHAIR |  |
| FINAL SUMMARY | Chair to make clear to all participants, task holders, accountable officers the minimum expectations and summary of actions agreed to de-escalate and by when |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPEL LEVEL</th>
<th>Acute</th>
<th>Whole System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Declaration of position following call</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>