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Patient safety incident investigation

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What is a patient safety incident investigation?

A patient safety incident investigation (PSII) is undertaken when an incident or near-miss indicates significant patient safety risks and potential for new learning.

Investigations explore decisions or actions as they relate to the situation. The method is based on the premise that actions or decisions are consequences, not causes, and is guided by the principle that people are well intentioned and strive to do the best they can.

The goal is to understand why an action and/or decision was deemed appropriate by those involved at the time.

Process





Stage	Description
Identify a team/learning response lead	The investigation team should be formed based on factors including availability, systems-focused safety investigation knowledge and interests. The lead should be the single point of contact, participate in all phases of the investigation and collaborate with subject matter experts as appropriate. See <u>Patient safety incident response standards</u> for details on training requirements.
Commence engagement with those affected	This process should start as soon as possible. See <u>Engaging and involving patients, families and staff following a patient</u> <u>safety incident.</u>
Agree terms of reference (ToR)	The crafting of precise and clear ToRs is a critical stage as it will determine how effective the investigation is and satisfaction with its output. See: <u>Terms of reference</u> guide.
Gather information	In this stage the learning response leads look 'down and into' a patient safety incident. The objective is to gather as much information as possible about what happened.
	See: <u>Everyday work guides</u> (ie observations, link analysis, walkthrough analysis and interview tool) for different approaches to information gathering.
Build narrative	Build a detailed narrative from the information gathered.
	The narrative does not need to be broken down by time – often people operate from activity to activity rather than minute to minute. Unlike a film or a novel, incidents do not have a beginning, middle and an end.
	See: <u>Timeline mapping</u> template.
Analysis	The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) Safety investigation guidelines (2011) defines analysis as: "the process of making conclusions or findings about something". ¹ Analysis is an iterative process at the centre of an investigation (see Figure 1) – it may reveal the need for further information gathering, and when writing your investigation report you may identify the need for further analysis. Analysis starts at the beginning of an investigation but will be
	and years and years at the beginning of an involtigation but will be

¹ The ATSB also define analysis as "the process where available data is reviewed, evaluated and then converted into a series of arguments, which produce a series of relevant findings. It is the link between the collected data and the findings of an investigation" (ATSB, 2011).

Stage	Description
	more prominent after information gathering and continues until the investigation report is finalised.
	There are no detailed, prescriptive rules that can be applied in all situations. Ultimately analysis relies on informed judgement and is, to some extent, subjective. However, a system focused framework and/or tools should be used to reduce the risk of investigation conclusions and findings are overly subjective.
	The following structure can help develop useful, realistic findings that will be widely accepted:
	 application of a consistent framework throughout information gathering (eg SEIPS – see <u>SEIPS quick reference and work</u> <u>system explorer</u>)
	 structured set of analysis stages (see Appendix)
	a team-based approach
	 knowledge about the domain being investigated.
	The output of the analysis stage is an agreed set of findings.
	See <u>Work system scan and interaction map</u> for a template to document findings.
Safety action development	See <u>Safety action development guide</u> .
Report preparation	Before writing your report consider:
	 Who is going to be reading it – are there language implications?
	Who needs to be involved?
	 When is the report required – can you meet this timeline?
	 How will needs of the readers be accommodated?
	 How should the report be formatted, including how will findings be described?

Tips

Capture multiple perspectives to reduce bias

Bias can significantly change the way data is used or interpreted. Once people know the outcome of an incident, it will be impossible for them to be without bias when looking back at what happened. For this reason, it is important to avoid forming conclusions too early.

Remember that the recollections of individuals will already be filtered through their own bias, mental models, and rationalisation. Investigation team members are not objective observers of reality – they will also be making sense of an incident and introducing biases and heuristics when doing so.

The narrative should showcase the incident from as many perspectives as appropriate. Differences in perspective do not need to be resolved in one 'correct' narrative. All perspectives need to be valued and this is likely to result in a complex narrative.

Capture the 'view from inside the tunnel'²

Focus on understanding the actions as they appeared to the people 'inside the situation'.

Strive to enable readers to 'walk in the shoes' of the incident's key players. At a minimum, the narrative should use the information known at the time to show how the decisions taken made sense within the social and cultural context.

The investigation team should seek to understand how the incident was perceived by those involved and why their actions/decisions made sense at the time they were taken.

Do not use the term cause

In legal contexts the term cause is strongly associated with blame and liability. There are also semantic difficulties with the term; many complicated philosophical arguments surround what constitutes a cause.

Avoid ranking contributory factors by degree of 'contributory-ness'

Avoid differentiating contributory factors in terms of degree of connection or perceived importance in relation to the incident. Ranking in terms of degree of contribution can be perceived as a way of differentiating the level of responsibility or blame for the incident.

² Dekker. S. (2014). The field guide to understanding 'human error'. (3rd Ed) CRC Press

Appendix: Suggested structure for analysis

Analysis phase	Description
Preliminary review	Organise information in a format suitable for analysis (eg into SEIPS 'buckets' – see <u>SEIPS quick reference and work system</u> <u>explorer</u>). Includes systematic review of narrative.
Finding identification	Search for patterns or themes in the information you have collected (see <u>Thematic review top tips</u>) to identify hazards (ie potential sources of harm).
	The investigation may identify a range of hazards: some may be 'contributory' (ie if they had not arisen the incident would 'probably' ³ not have happened); others may not be contributory but may be identified during an investigation. All should be considered findings.
	Try not to favour a particular finding, keep an open mind.
	Use a multidisciplinary team approach to ensure different perspectives are captured (see <u>SHARE debrief guide</u>).
Risk analysis	Use a structured process to determine the risk associated with identified findings.
	You could classify risk by estimating consequence and likelihood. Alternatively, simple rules of thumb can be used based on general principles such as:
	 starting where the patient will experience the most difference
	 starting with the most common failures.
	'Increase in risk' needs to be interpreted realistically rather than pedantically (eg the process for starting an infusion would not normally be considered a safety factor unless it was done in such a way that increased risk relative to normal operations).
	Agree the findings to be included in your patient safety incident investigation report.
Analysis review	Review the agreed findings to identify gaps or weaknesses.

Adapted from Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2011)

³ In most situations, it is not possible to specify that a factor was contributory with absolute certainty. Those that can be specified with more certainty are usually those most closely connected in terms of time or physical proximity, eg individual actions.